We consider alternative methods of supervising staff who have significant discretion and whose efforts are subject to both incomplete information and skewed incentives. Specifically, we examine online affiliate marketing programs in which merchants oversee thousands of affiliates they have never met. Some merchants hire specialist outside advisors to set and enforce policies for affiliates, while other merchants ask their ordinary marketing staff to perform these functions. For clear violations of applicable rules, we find that outside advisors are most effective at excluding the responsible affiliates-which we interpret as a benefit of specialization. However, in-house staff are more successful at identifying and excluding affiliates whose practices are viewed as "borderline" (albeit still contrary to merchants' interests), foregoing the efficiencies of specialization in favor of the better incentives of a company's staff. We consider implications for marketing of online affiliate programs and for online marketing more generally.
Introduction
Online marketing invites advertisers to attempt a sharply increased quantity of partnerships, compared to historic advertising methods. For one, online relationships reduce the transaction costs of buying ad placements: in many advertising marketplaces, standardized contracts let an advertiser accept a proposed placement with a single click, and ad networks widely sell bundles of hundreds or thousands of placements. Meanwhile, many advertisers find they can get valuable leads and favorable pricing from the Internet's myriad small sites. Of course these numerous relationships entail costs including selecting, compensating, and supervising the sites-making sure each site is suitable to show the advertiser's offer, and making sure sites in fact deliver the promised benefits.
Advertisers thus turn to specialists and outside firms to handle important aspects of advertisingbuying. In practice, online advertising typically features multiple levels of outsourcing-paying unaffiliated sites to show the ads, and also often delegating to some outside company the oversight and management of the advertising program.
In this paper, we evaluate advertisers' chosen management structures by measuring the relative prevalence of advertising fraud targeting advertisers engaged in online "affiliate marketing," a performance-based compensation system increasingly common in online ad campaigns. Specifically, we identify the vulnerabilities best addressed by outsourcing marketing management to external specialists, versus the problems better overseen by keeping management decisions in-house. We find outside advisors most effective at enforcing clear rules, but in-house staff excel at preventing practices viewed as "borderline" under industry norms.
While our results apply most directly to advertisers considering the management structure of their online marketing programs, our analysis also speaks to a broader literature of outsourcing and boundary of the firm. Managers often face a tradeoff between retaining functions in-house (typically with greater supervision and greater control over quality) versus outsourcing to a specialist (who may have greater capability or a cost advantage thanks to scale and experience). In general, these questions are challenging for empirical estimation: It is often difficult to find a context with numerous similar insourcing/outsourcing decisions, and companies' structures are usually confidential and hence unobservable to researchers. In contrast, we examine an online marketing context where advertisers often reveal their management structures as they recruit marketing affiliates, and where important aspects of outcomes are observable using software we develop for that purpose.
2 Affiliate marketing, fraud, and management structure Affiliate marketing combines sharp performance incentives with the broader efficiencies of online advertising. In particular, affiliate marketing compensation is usually purely performance-basedperhaps a $5 or 10% advertising fee for each purchase. Under standard rules, an affiliate earns a commission only if 1) a user browses to an affiliate's site, 2) the user clicks the affiliates speciallycoded link to the merchant, and 3) the user makes a purchase from the merchant. ( [12] ) These additional requirements importantly differ from better-known methods of online advertising: Most display ads ("banner ads") require an advertiser to pay as soon as a web site serves an ad to the user, and almost all search ads require an advertiser to pay as soon as a user clicks an ad.
Affiliate marketing payment rules are understood to protect advertisers against certain wasted expenses. Consider payment structures and resulting risks in other online advertising implementations. For example, a banner advertiser might worry that few users will click its ads: Perhaps the ads are irrelevant to users' interests or are placed in locations where few users notice. Some of these factors are importantly outside the advertiser's control, and the advertiser might perceive a high risk that its payment will be wasted. Similarly, an advertiser buying search ads risks extra expense if uninterested users, competitors, or fraudsters click or purportedly click. ( [22] ) In contrast, affiliate marketing payment is only due if a user makes a purchase-aligning advertising expense more closely with an advertiser's revenue and profit.
Affiliate marketing is distinctive in that most affiliate merchants buy advertising from small marketing affiliates they have never met, including affiliates with few to no assets, affiliates lacking well-known brand names or established reputations, and affiliates in remote locations. Small, lowasset, distant marketing partners present obvious risks of unaccountability, but merchants typically consider themselves at least partially protected from rogue affiliates thanks to the structure of affiliate compensation contracts: So long as a user actually makes a purchase, merchants generally perceive that there is little downside to paying a marketing commission. For example LinkShare, a leading affiliate network, historically prominently promised advertisers that they would "pay affiliates only when a sale or other qualifying action is completed," an approach which LinkShare touted as "very efficient." ( [19] )
Notwithstanding the initial practitioner view of affiliate marketing as structurally protected from fraud, affiliate marketing suffers from significant affiliate misbehavior including the various practices we examine in Section 2.2. Our tabulation of affiliate litigation ( [11] ) reveals a dozen affiliate frauds large enough to spur legal action, including two affiliates who collectively took $21 million from eBay-making them eBay's largest affiliates in the relevant period, although the "advertising" they provided was later revealed to be completely worthless. Because the practices at issue satisfy the elements of common law fraud and have been charged as fraud in both civil and criminal litigation ( [11] ), we call these practices affiliate fraud.
With other advertising formats significantly better established, one might ask why merchants choose affiliate marketing. The literature offers some insight. [18] considers the similar context of publishers selling "leads" such as signups from users purportedly interested in a given service.
[18] emphasizes the risk of publisher moral hazard (perhaps filling out the form with names from a phone book), suggesting that payment structure can shift incentives to discourage such misbehavior.
(For example, the advertiser might pay the publisher only for those customers who actually make purchases.) We develop [18] by evaluating the effectiveness of the resulting relationships including schemes that are measured as productive but do not actually advance advertisers' interests. We also build on [18] by considering the management structure that oversees these relationships.
In the analogous context of sites deciding whether to charge advertisers for ads being displayed versus for ads being clicked, [23] notes the role of advertiser heterogeneity as well as uncertain levels of advertiser effort in attracting clicks. If an advertiser pays for every click, it should design its ad to attract only clicks from users who are genuinely interested. In contrast, an advertiser paying for displays might as well invite every click possible. In the context we consider, merchants are generally perceived to be trustworthy, but affiliates are highly heterogeneous. As [23] note (p.251), cost-per-action affiliate marketing is to cost-per-click ads as cost-per-click is to cost-per-impression, and the [23] principles flow through accordingly.
A separate stream of research questions the measurability and effectiveness of various online advertising. [17] examines the noisiness of sales benefits compared to underlying random variation, concluding that even a successful ad campaign may be difficult to distinguish from zero effect. In a field experiment, [3] finds search ads offering much lower short-term benefits than conventional estimates suggest, including no benefits from brand-keyword ads. We follow their broad skepticism of the measurability and benefits of online advertising, exploring the potential mishaps and merchants' varying abilities to prevent these problems.
Meanwhile, questions of firm boundaries, information, and incentives have arisen in numerous contexts far from online marketing. For example, [2] considers incentives and contractual incompleteness among shippers and truck drivers, noting the role of new technology in shifting market structure by facilitating verification of work done. While we examine quite a different market, we note that affiliate marketing is grounded in granular tracking-improved information collection broadly similar to the trucking on-board computers that motivate [2] . [16] surveys research on the causes and consequences of firm boundaries across numerous sectors.
The institutions of affiliate marketing
An affiliate marketing merchant is the web site seeking to sell goods or services through online advertising. Affiliate marketing merchants span the gamut of online commerce, from the web's largest sellers, including Amazon, to mom-and-pop specialty sites.
An affiliate or publisher is a web site that presents links to its visitors. For example, when reviewing a book, an affiliate could link to Amazon to facilitate purchases of that book. When suggesting a travel destination, a travel blog could link to a page at Expedia offering hotels in that area. These are "white-hat" permitted affiliate practices; other affiliates use the prohibited practices explored in Section 2.2.
A network connects merchants to affiliates. Most merchants rely on networks for tracking, administration, and accounting purposes-recording which users clicked which links and made what purchases; providing a secure web site for affiliates to obtain links and check results; and, often, providing efficient payment to numerous affiliates each month. In principle merchants could handle these tasks in-house, and some of the web's largest affiliate marketers have done so (including Amazon since the inception of its affiliate program, and more recently eBay and Apple). But most merchants prefer the benefits of specialization. Networks impose some rules as to permissible affiliate practices, but merchants can waive most such rules or add other requirements of their own.
An affiliate program manager sets the rules of an affiliate program including how much affiliates will be paid, what behaviors are permitted, and which affiliates to accept or reject. Section 2.4
explores the various models of affiliate program management.
Fraud in affiliate marketing
Though practitioners often frame affiliate marketing as allowing little or no fraud, [7] and [5] reveal significant scope of affiliate misbehavior. For example, some affiliates place merchants' offers in places merchants do not want: merchants might refuse to advertise on adult sites even if such ads yield sales. That said, according to the distinctive rules of affiliate marketing, commission is only paid if a user makes a purchase. With only limited exceptions not present in our data (see e.g.
[1]), rogue affiliates seeking to inflate their fees do have to find some way to identify users who will purchase from a given merchant. Our data is grounded in four such schemes, which we have found to be the largest areas of affiliate malfeasance:
1. Adware. When a user visits a merchant's site on a computer running certain advertising software, the software can see the user's activity and redirect the user through the affiliate's marketing links. In this way, if the user makes a purchase, the affiliate will be credited as the putative cause of that purchase.
2. Cookie-stuffing. When a user visits a web page, a section of that page can claim to refer the user to a given merchant. If the user happens to make a purchase from that merchant within a predetermined time thereafter (often seven to 30 days), the affiliate will be credited. In variations, the affiliate can design its page to attract traffic to particular merchants (perhaps by repeatedly mentioning the merchant's name or by promising, truthfully or falsely, to offer coupons for that merchant). The affiliate could also design its cookie-stuffing to be a component of some other web page (a dot on a banner ad, or a section of a comment on a forum or blog).
3. Typosquatting. Affiliates register domain names that are misspellings of merchants' domain names. ( [20] ) When a user misspells a merchant's domain name in the way that the affiliate anticipated, the user will be sent to the affiliate's site, which immediately redirects the user through an affiliate link and onwards to the merchant. If the user makes a purchase, the affiliate will be credited.
4. Loyalty software. Affiliates place "loyalty" software on a user's computer to remind the user about possible rebates, points, or other benefits from purchasing through certain merchants.
The loyalty software automatically sends a user through an affiliate's link when the user requests a merchant's site directly. Typically, loyalty software becomes installed as part of a bundle when users ask for wholly unrelated software. Often, loyalty software claims affiliate commission even if the user had never registered with the loyalty service and is hence incapable of claiming or receiving benefits. We note some debate whether "loyalty" software in fact creates customer loyalty-and if so, whether to the merchant or to the maker of the loyalty software. But we accept the term since it is widely used by practitioners.
The schemes we examine are a subset of unwanted affiliate behavior. For example, other rogue affiliates engage in trademark bidding-buying search engine advertising for a merchant's name, then sending the resulting users through merchants' affiliate links and claiming affiliate commission on resulting sales. Sophisticated merchants largely disallow this practice because it tends to increase competition in the search engine advertising auction (adding an extra bidder who a merchant must outbid) and/or because merchants have found they can buy these same keywords at lower cost than their affiliates. Typically, merchants ban this practice through merchant-specific terms and conditions. In principle we could observe each merchant's stated rules, then check for violations.
But some merchants provide selected affiliates with waivers of their general rules, and we do not observe those waivers. Moreover, varying merchant rules would add significant complexity: a given practice might be a violation for one merchant but permissible for another. We therefore focus on the behaviors listed above, where a merchant's interest is more clear-cut.
Practitioners' views of affiliate fraud
Affiliate marketing practitioners have differing views on the practices presented in Section 2.2.
In general, adware is viewed as clearly impermissible, specifically forbidden by most network contracts. Practitioners share similar views of cookie-stuffing. We refer to these practices as "clearcut" violations.
In contrast, practitioners offer diverging evaluations of typosquatting. Some affiliate managers view typosquatting traffic as helpful to users and likely to reach users who would otherwise get lostand not purchase-due to a browser error message. Other affiliate managers note that typosquatting is contrary to federal law (the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 USC §1125(d)), that typosquatting entails forcing clicks contrary to affiliate network rules, and that most web browsers would direct the user to the genuine site without charging a merchant any advertising fee.
Practitioners are even more divided in their views of loyalty software. Some affiliate managers view these loyalty applications as desirable, noting that users value the points and rebates, that competitors also participate in these loyalty programs, and that users might shift to a competitor if a given merchant leaves a loyalty program. Other affiliate managers view loyalty applications as charging affiliate commission on traffic that merchants would otherwise have received without charge. They argue that if a user did not care about the loyalty benefit enough to manually browse to the loyalty service's web site, the user is unlikely to shift a purchase to a competitor. Critics of loyalty applications also note the prevalence of loyalty applications being installed onto users' computers without users requesting such installation, risking paying commission without the users getting any benefit or being motivated by any rebate or points.
In our view, critics of typosquatting and loyalty software have stronger arguments: Both typosquatting and loyalty software claim commissions on sales that merchants would otherwise receive without charge, which is contrary to merchants' interests. But standard contracts include no ex-plicit prohibition on either typosquatting or loyalty software, whereas standard contracts typically do exclude adware and cookie-stuffing. To the extent that typosquatting and loyalty software are prohibited, the ban comes from more general contract provisions such as a requirement that a user must "click" a link in order for commission to be earned, whereas no such click occurs in typosquatting or in loyalty software. Even where these practices are forbidden by a fair reading of applicable contracts, practitioners often decline to enforce those provisions or offer differing opinions about the proper interpretation of those provisions. Despite our firm view that these practices are contrary to merchants' interests, we call these practices "grey area" in recognition of diverging views among relevant practitioners.
Affiliate program management structure
Facing the prospect of rogue affiliates and affiliates that are otherwise undesirable, merchants must decide which affiliates to accept into their affiliate programs. More generally, merchants must also decide which affiliates to reject, which affiliates deserve a bonus, and what compensation and other rules to establish more broadly. Merchants have found three means to structure these decisions:
1. In-house affiliate management staff. A merchant can assign or hire an ordinary employee to select and manage affiliates. Discussions with affiliate managers reveal that most such staff are paid on a salaried basis, albeit often with performance objectives. Some receive explicit contingent compensation ("$10,000 bonus if our program grows by 10% next year"). We believe most affiliate managers' performance-based compensation is implicit, with a larger program largely viewed as calling for greater compensation. Of course affiliate mangers' longterm compensation is also typically tied at least in part to company health, including via equity as well as opportunities for advancement, and camaraderie and intrinsic motivation further encourage affiliate managers to consider company objectives.
2. Specialist affiliate-management companies. A merchant can retain the services of a vendor that specializes in affiliate marketing management. Practitioners often call these vendors "outsourced program managers" or OPMs. Industry sources reveal scores of OPMs ranging from sole practitioners to modest-sized firms of at most a few dozen staff. A sole-practitioner OPM might manage three to ten programs, while a large OPM could manage a hundred programs or more. OPM contracts vary equally widely-some are flat fees (e.g. $3,000 per month to manage a given program), while others are percentage ("20% of spend") and some are hybrids. OPM staffing is also diverse: Some OPMs assign a full-time staff person to a single large merchant, while other OPM staff may manage a dozen programs.
3. Affiliate network provides management services. Most merchants retain the services of an affiliate network to provide the required technical infrastructure including specially-coded links, tracking of which purchases were made through which links, reporting of purchases, and streamlined payments to affiliates. Merchants can also turn to affiliate networks for management services including judgment of which affiliates to accept and reject. Networks' fees to merchants are largely proportional to the total commission merchants pay: For one, While OPMs often join networks in using proportional fees, networks' fees are virtually certain to be larger in percentage terms, giving networks greater reason to take actions that increase merchants' costs. Suppose a network and an OPM both charge 20% fees for management service, while the network charges 30% for tracking service. If an OPM takes an action that increases a merchant's cost by $1, the OPM collects additional revenue of $0.20. But if the network takes that same action, the network enjoys additional revenue of $0.50. Since networks' tracking services have minimal marginal cost, the network's additional revenue is best understood as pure profit.
Thus, networks have a notably stronger incentive to increase merchants' costs, compared to the corresponding incentive for OPMs.
Management structures also differ in their access to information about affiliates' practices.
An in-house affiliate manager has access to whatever data the network chooses to provide plus whatever information the affiliate manager can collect from an affiliate or through independent research. In contrast, an OPM can combine data from multiple merchants-using information about an affiliate's effectiveness or integrity in promoting one of the OPM's merchants to evaluate the affiliate's suitability for other merchants that hire the same OPM. Finally, a network enjoys the greatest level of information about affiliates' practices. For one, a network's systems store and tabulate data about each affiliate's actions across the entire network, and network program managers in some instances can access this data via mechanisms unavailable to in-house managers and OPMs. Furthermore, network program managers have closer access to other network staff including the account managers who are affiliates' standard points of contact as well as the "network quality" investigators who evaluate possible violations of network rules.
Hypotheses
As detailed in Section 2, affiliate program management structures vary both in the information available to managers, and in the compensation structure and resulting incentives. These differences yield testable implications for affiliate management decisions and for resulting outcomes. Hypothesis 2 In-house managers are most effective at detecting and excluding rogue affiliates.
Clearly Hypothesis 1 and 2 cannot both be true. Rather, we present these competing hypotheses as alternative visions of the interplay between information and incentives.
As discussed in Section 4, our data includes separate measurements of multiple types of affiliate misbehavior. Any differing prevalence of clear-cut violations versus "grey area" violations (Section 2.3) could yield insight into the mechanism of management decision-making in this area.
We offer two hypotheses grounded in interactions between management structure and the type of affiliate misbehavior:
Hypothesis 3 Affiliate networks are most effective at detecting and excluding rogue affiliates engaged in clear-cut violations of applicable policies.
Hypothesis 4
In-house managers are most effective at detecting and excluding rogue affiliates whose practices are viewed as "grey area."
These hypotheses reflect differing understandings of why merchants might work with "grey area" affiliates. Hypothesis 3 is grounded in networks' superior information: With greatest information about affiliates' practices, Hypothesis 3 posits that networks can better exclude borderline practices-a plausible understanding if the borderline practices are difficult to uncover. In contrast, Hypothesis 4 anticipates that managers' incentives are a major driver of affiliate misbehavior-in which case an in-house manager, with incentives most closely aligned with the merchant, can better exclude borderline practices.
Data

Merchant management structure
We begin with data on which merchants use which marketing structures. Each merchant using the largest three US affiliate networks (Commission Junction, Google Affiliate Network, and LinkShare) offers a merchant "detail" page with information about the merchant's general offerings, commission payments to affiliates, and requirements for affiliates. 69% of merchants' pages provide a contact email address for affiliates with questions about a given affiliate program, while 31% of pages provide no email address.
We categorize merchants' posted email addresses to draw inferences about the management structure of each merchant's affiliate program. For example, if the email address is a named individual person at the merchant, we categorize that merchant as managing its own affiliate program. If the email address is a named individual or role account at an OPM, we categorize that merchant as delegating affiliate management tasks to an OPM. If the email address is a named individual or role account at an affiliate network, we categorize the merchant as delegating affiliate management tasks to a network. We are able to categorize 62% of merchants in this way.
Some merchant email addresses are difficult to categorize. For example, a Gmail account could be serving to forward mail to one or multiple staff at any combination of merchant, OPM, or network. A Gmail account could also be used to let the merchant more easily switch from one OPM to another or from in-house management to OPM or network, or vice versa. For an ambiguity of this form or for lack of any email address at all, we mark as "unknown" the remaining 38% of merchants.
Affiliate practices
To evaluate the effectiveness of alternative affiliate management structures, we need data on all manner of affiliate misbehavior. For that, we turn to automation we built for this and other purposes. [13] describes this automation, which includes 150 virtual computers running in 80 datacenters in nine countries. Whereas standard web crawlers load only a page's HTML source code, our automation renders entire web pages in full virtual computers running standard web browsers. In this way, we examine pages just as users see them-including code that standard crawlers would not be able to load or interpret. Our automation also simulates random user interaction with web pages to further mimic standard user activities and to trigger any page or program functions that await user activity. Through this robust reenactment of users' browsing, our approach successfully runs any tricky code that web pages may use to perform cookie-stuffing.
By installing adware and loyalty software onto some of our virtual computers, we can also test the effects of that software, allowing us to identify and count all the practices listed in Section 2.2. Our automation classifies each occurrence with the type of infraction and the victim merchant, allowing us to estimate the amount of fraud, of each type, targeting each merchant.
We check for affiliate fraud targeting every merchant using the three largest US affiliate networks as of February 2012, a total of 4,523 merchants. We collected all data during February-March 2012.
All told, our automation ran more than 2 million page-loads, finding 18,264 distinct observations in which 4,815 rogue affiliates targeted 2,446 merchants. Table 1 presents summary statistics about our data, and Table 2 tabulates the merchants with various numbers of affiliate violations.
When searching intensively for affiliate fraud targeting an individual merchant, our automation spends hundreds or thousands of computer-hours examining the various mechanisms which affiliates might use to target that merchant. But with thousands of merchants to be tested for this project, capacity constraints limited us to briefer searches. Our data is thus best understood as a sample of the affiliate fraud targeting affected merchants.
Combining these data sources, we offer a measure of which merchants-with which management structure-suffer how much affiliate misbehavior and of which types.
Endogeneity concerns
The structure and sequence of merchant decision-making reduce the risk of endogeneity biasing our estimates. Our estimates would be biased if some merchants knew they were at greater risk of fraud, and if those merchants chose particular management structures with an eye to reducing fraud. But our discussions with practitioners indicate that few to no merchants choose management structure in light of merchant-specific information about fraud.
For one, fraud is not typically a primary concern when merchants choose to open an affiliate marketing program. As a threshold matter, most merchants view affiliate marketing as a lowrisk strategy, including as discussed in the introduction. Furthermore, most merchants' choice of management structure seems to reflect primary focus on capability and cost: Merchants most often choose in-house management if they already have suitable expertise on staff or if they deem network management too costly. Conversely, merchants most often choose network management if they lack appropriate expertise and seek accelerated results.
Networks' statements confirm the view that the risk of fraud is not a primary impetus for the choice of management structure. Commission Junction offers a flyer and detail page presenting the benefits of its "full program management" offering. The flyer nowhere mentions any benefit of excluding unwanted affiliates, and the detail page mentions this service only in a sub-page reached via an additional click. These marketing materials do not encourage merchants to choose a particular management structure with an eye to excluding rogue affiliates or preventing fraud more generally.
Finally, it appears unlikely that merchants possesses special information about their merchantspecific risks of fraud at the time when they choose a management structure. In general, the frauds we study can affect any merchant, and most merchants are affected roughly in proportion to the size of their affiliate programs. (One important exception is that the web's largest merchants are more vulnerable to untargeted cookie-stuffing, but this problem affects only a handful of exceptionally large merchants.) If a merchant lacks information about its individual fraud risk at the time when it chooses its management structure, it cannot choose management structure to reduce fraud, ending the risk of endogeneity. A merchant's concern about fraud generally, and its desire to choose a management structure robust to fraud, would not bias our results so long as this concern is not correlated with a distinctive merchant vulnerability to fraud.
In principle endogeneity could also result from the sampling caused by our incomplete search for affiliate fraud (as discussed in Section 4.2). If some types of merchants are systematically targeted by affiliate fraud that is more skillfully concealed, our automation might fail to find those practices and might conclude, incorrectly, that those merchants are not targeted at all. But within each type of affiliate fraud, most incidents are roughly similar in concealment. We find statistically significant relationships between management structure and prevalence of fraud even within a given type of affiliate fraud (see Table 7 ), which means that differences across types of fraud are not driving our results. More generally, it is difficult to identify a business practice or other reason that would cause the form of interdependence that would bias our results. Table 1 reports summary statistics as to the affiliate practices we observed. Table 2 reports that some merchants suffer much more affiliate fraud than others: For nearly half the merchants we checked, we found no affiliate fraud at all, but for the most-targeted merchants, we found dozens of instances of affiliate fraud. Table 3 tabulates merchant management structure, both on an overall basis and for specific networks. Merchant-managed programs are most common at all the networks we examine, although we are unable to identify the management structure of approximately 38% of merchants' affiliate programs. (Recall the data limitations discussed in Section 4.1.) Table 4 reports the average number of affiliate fraud observations we found, by activity type and by network. The listed practices are largely comparable in their prevalence across networks.
Results
Summary statistics
Google Affiliate Network has the least fraud of each type. Table 5 totals the number of affiliate IDs engaged in each practice, across all merchants and by network.
Estimation framework
We now turn to our main results, estimating the effect of management structure on affiliate fraud.
We run regressions of the following structure:
Here, i indexes merchants. In some specifications, j indexes types of affiliate fraud, required for separately analyzing various types of affiliate fraud. k indexes types of merchant management structure, with an omitted type of in-house management.
In some specifications, we add controls for merchant characteristics. We control for merchant site popularity via a polynomial in merchant site Alexa traffic rank. (We add higher-order polynomial terms as instructed by [21] .) We control for merchant site type using a set of dummy variables for each top-level category in Alexa's taxonomy of web sites. We control for possible differing rates of fraud across affiliate networks by adding a dummy variable for each network. Because affiliates might find it more profitable to defraud the merchants that pay larger commissions, we control for merchant payout per click (Earnings Per Click or "EPC") as reported by affiliate networks' detail pages for each merchant. 1 We run all regressions using a negative binomial model. The f raud ij variable gives the number of times we observed fraudulent affiliates targeting merchant i. Holding constant the details of a merchant and its management structure, we might think of the merchant accepting each of some large number of affiliate applicants with some constant probability-matching the structure of the negative binomial distribution. ( [4] ) Results are qualitatively similar when we run the estimation using Ordinary Least Squares regression, but OLS is misspecified in that the number of incidents of affiliate fraud (of each type, for each merchant) is a count variable, necesarily nonnegative and better modeled by the negative binomial distribution.
Throughout, our analysis uses a dependent variable of the number of observations of affiliate fraud. If we observed a given affiliate engaging in a listed practice multiple times-perhaps buying so much adware traffic that our crawlers observed the affiliate repeatedly even in limited testing, or typosquatting using multiple domains-then that affiliate counts multiple times in the listed variable. This approach captures a portion of variation in affiliate size: an affiliate engaged in a large-scale activity, for example widespread use of adware or numerous typosquatting domains, harms a merchant more than an affiliate whose behavior is more limited. In reports not reported here, we also run all analysis at the level of distinct affiliates. Results are qualitatively similar, although some coefficient estimates shift in statistical significance.
5.3 Effect of management structure on affiliate fraud Table 6 reports regression results summing across all types of affiliate fraud. With and without controls for merchant site popularity, networks suffer more fraud than programs managed by inhouse staff. Note the positive coefficient on Managed by Network in all specifications of Table 6 . Table 6 finds no statistically significant difference in fraud rates when programs are run by merchants' in-house staff versus by outsourced specialists OPMs. In one specification, the difference is slightly positive, and in another it is slightly negative, but neither is statistically significantly different from zero.
5.4
Interactions between management structure and type of affiliate fraud Table 7 reports results separated by the type of affiliate fraud observed. Networks have less adware than in-house-managed programs (column 1), denoted by the negative coefficient on Managed by Network. But networks have more typosquatting (column 3), and the difference between network management and in-house management is not significant for cookie-stuffing and loyalty apps (columns 2 and 4). Tables 7 and 8 offer insight into the mechanism causing in-house programs to suffer, on the whole, less fraud (as found in Section 5.3). Recall that relevant practitioners regard cookie-stuffing and adware as clear violations. Table 7 columns 3 and 4 (aggregated in Table 8 column 2) report that in-house programs do better at excluding those "grey area" practices, as Hypothesis 4 predicts. Thus, Table 7 indicates that network management best excludes clear-cut violations while in-house management better detects grey area violations. Because grey area violations considerably more widespread (per Table 5 ), on net in-house-managed programs are more successful at excluding fraud. Tables 7 and 8 
Interpreting coefficient estimates
The estimated coefficients in our regression analyses are modest in magnitude. For example, Table 6 reports that a merchant that shifts from in-house to network management would likely suffer 0.19 to 0.41 more observations of affiliate fraud found via our search methodology, i.e. less than one additional fraudulent affiliate joining the merchant's program. Though this sounds like a small effect, we believe it is nonetheless economically significant.
For one, our data collection process necesarily uncovers only a small portion of affiliate fraud.
As discussed in Section 4.2, our automation expends limited time searching for practices targeting each individual merchant; with thousands of merchants to evaluate, it is infeasible for our crawlers to find all the fraudulent affiliates targeting all merchants. Based on our long-term examinations of affiliate fraud targeting selected merchants, we estimate that the data analyzed in this paper considers at most one tenth of merchants' affiliate fraud. For example, while our automation found on average 1.1 fraudulent affiliates for each merchant we examined, in separate focused searching, we usually find ten or more fraudulent affiliates in the first year of work. Furthermore, our automation found at most 14 distinct fraudulent affiliates targeting the most-targeted merchant in our data, Concerned merchants might reasonably look to the legal system-both to recover losses and to deter infractions in the first place. But legal remedies seem to offer limited protection against affiliate misbehavior. In the cases summarized in [11] , merchants largely recovered most of the fees they had paid to the rogue affiliates there at issue, but there is no suggestion that merchants recovered the large transaction costs such as attorneys fees, technical experts, and distraction of management from their core businesses. Moreover, the disputes that end up in litigation are highly unrepresentative-limited to instances where a merchant realized it was defrauded, was able to find the perpetrator, and anticipated that bringing suit would yield a recovery sufficient to justify the effort. We are aware of literally hundreds of incidents of merchants accepting affiliate fraud as "unavoidable," largely because these factors were not met. Merchants may be correct ex post, but if alternative marketing management structures could reduce such frauds, the size of merchants'
losses suggests that such efforts should be cost-effective.
Although we focus on malfeasance in the context of affiliate marketing, similar problems extend to other forms of online advertising. Advertisers buying search engine advertising tend to focus on questions of bidding and targeting, but search syndication networks also place ads into all manner of sites, including sites that are highly undesirable. ( [6, 8, 10] ) Similarly, display ads risk placements in invisible windows ( [9] ), in locations covered with other ads ( [14] ), and via automatic reloads ( [14] ), among other infractions. Uncovering and resolving these problems calls for diverse skills as close to computer forensics and law enforcement as to marketing and advertising-a marked change from the simpler contracts and better-understood risks associated with advertising in other media. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
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